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Social Psychology and Social Justice: Dilemmas, Dy­
namics, and Destinies 
Kenneth J. Gergen
The Oxford Handbook of Social Psychology and Social Justice
Edited by Phillip L. Hammack Jr.
 
Abstract and Keywords
The emergence of this handbook on social justice represents a groundbreaking event in 
the history of social psychology. In this summary discussion, I outline significant limits to 
social justice work embedded in the empiricist tradition of inquiry and point to ways in 
which the current work transcends these limits. However, I also view the present endeav­
ors as in a fledgling state. In the service of enriching and rendering these pursuits more 
effective, I discuss five domains in which tensions currently prevail and suggest direc­
tions for future undertakings. Challenges are discussed in terms of epistemological 
schisms, presumed ontologies, value pluralism, explanatory paradigms, and the limits of 
representationalism. A final invitation is made to shift from a mirroring orientation to re­
search to world-making.
Keywords: epistemology, ethics, pluralism, representationalism, social construction, social psychology, pragmatics
The arrival of the Oxford Handbook of Social Psychology and Social Justice into the world 
of social psychology represents a mammoth shift in the conception of the science and its 
potential offerings to society. My attempt in what follows is both to reflect on this impor­
tant venture and to deliberate on its emergent potentials. At the outset, it is important to 
understand the historical context from which the present volume has emerged and why 
the important topic of social justice has had such scant attention. For the past 50 years 
social psychology has been dominated by a singular philosophy of knowledge. It is a phi­
losophy of the early 20th century, long abandoned by much of the intellectual world, but 
nevertheless sustaining its grip on the field. This philosophy, typically indexed as logical 
empiricism (or post-positivism), places a premium on establishing evidence-based princi­
ples of human functioning. These principles, it is reasoned, should enable science to pre­
dict patterns of human behavior, and thus to provide the grounds for effective practices 
and policy-making. The emphasis on prediction and control is typically tied to a mechanis­
tic or causal explanatory orientation, and thus to experimentation as the preferred mode 
of investigation. This view of knowledge continues to provide the marching orders for 
most social psychological research.
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Yet while attractive in its optimism, this orientation to knowledge has failed to provide 
useful predictions about human activity outside the laboratory. This is not at all to fault 
the motives or values of the research community. As noted by Hammack (2018), the field 
has generally been associated with political liberalism. Rather, three of its philosophical 
legacies almost ensure its irrelevance to pressing issues of the times. The first of these 
legacies is furnished by the logical empiricist emphasis on establishing general laws or 
principles. Most research aims at testing a general hypothesis about human behavior. Us­
ing a problematic statistical logic, researchers strive to establish the universal validity of 
the propositions under test. Yet even for the most (p. 442) “validated” principle, there is 
no means of deriving predictions relevant to a particular case. This is not a problem of in­
sufficiently elaborated theory—that is, theory encompassing a greater number of vari­
ables, situations, or populations. Rather, it is a linguistic problem. General propositions 
do not contain within themselves a definitional structure that enables one to specify the 
particulars to which they apply. A theory of prejudice, for example, does not in itself spec­
ify what counts as prejudice. Nor do attempts at closer specification clarify the matter. 
Thus, to say that prejudice is “preconceived judgment” (as only one such definition) does 
not in itself tell us what activities or actions count as such. Are we speaking here of one’s 
choice of newspapers, ice cream, or marriage partners? And if it is to someone of “anoth­
er race,” does it mean when they are eating breakfast, helping their neighbors, or gazing 
at the sunset? Any such applications to specific situations will always depend on negotiat­
ed agreements among interlocutors, and there are no principled limits over the outcome 
of such negotiations. The discourse of prejudice, for example, is free floating within our 
public conversations and may with skill be applied (or not) to virtually any behavior.
The second impeding legacy is closely related to the first. If the aim of social psychology 
is to generate empirically grounded theories of human behavior, a primary emphasis is 
placed on research methods, and particularly to rigorous methods, with tight controls 
over possible biases and with measures that are both reliable and valid. Further, because 
the aim of such theories is to predict human behavior, experimentation is viewed as the 
methodology sine qua non. No other methodology, it is reasoned, can demonstrate cause 
and effect sequences, which is to say, the capability of predicting from a specified cause 
(independent variable) to a specified effect (dependent variable). Over the decades, the 
results of this commitment have virtually changed the face of mainstream social psycholo­
gy. Because the field has grown in numbers, and there is increasing competition for jour­
nal space, methodological rigor has become a major winnowing device. Demanded are in­
creasingly large samples, greater controls, more fully validated measures, multiple repli­
cations, and greater statistical sophistication. Increasingly, the practice of research has 
become a matter of technical expertise, with researchers functioning as mechanics link­
ing method to subject matter to grind out fortifications for abstract propositions.
This increasing demand for rigorous methods—“methodolatry” as critics put it—virtually 
disables any attempt to speak cogently to issues of social justice. At the outset, the de­
mand for controlled experimentation typically requires that research takes place in the 
confines of a laboratory. The artificiality of the conditions means that one can never study 
naturally occurring cases of injustice; conclusions of laboratory research can speak to 
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such issues only by analogy. The samples available to most laboratory researchers, 
housed as they are in predominantly white, upper middle class institutions, make any 
generalizations additionally tenuous. Further, issues of social justice are fraught with 
moral consequence, which place such issues beyond the reach of the ethical require­
ments for laboratory research. For example, oppressing, angering, or commanding labo­
ratory subjects would be proscribed. And of major significance, the naturally occurring 
phenomena that capture the interest of social justice researchers are typically of high 
complexity. As the contributors to the present volume attest, matters of history, politics, 
economy, and institutional structure—among others—may all play a part in matters of so­
cial justice. Reducing this complexity to experimental studies, where not more than three 
variables may interact at any given time, renders it impossible to draw conclusions of any 
particular utility to communities or nations confronted with challenges of social injustice.
There is a third legacy that leads to the general incapacity of traditional social psychology 
to make more than a tangential contribution to social issues. It is essentially the aim of 
the field to illuminate individual mental process. The problems here are two-fold. If the 
propositions that social psychologists hope to establish are about the nature of mental 
functioning (e.g., cognition, emotion, motivation), then issues of broad social significance 
will be marginalized. Whether matters of injustice, environmental degradation, or health 
care, for example, all are simply domains to which the results of such formulations may 
be applied. They are not the focus of research in itself. One may properly study the cogni­
tive basis of racism, for example, but the study of ongoing racist policies will escape at­
tention. As often argued, the study of the basic process can provide the grounds for wide­
spread application. However, as we have just seen, there is no means of deducing from 
the abstract formulation the particulars essential for effective action. Further, such fo­
cused inquiry will not generally be pursued because it is “applied research.” In the 
(p. 443) positivist tradition, application is inferior to the “pure research” focus on general 
laws.
The problem with the concerted focus on psychological process is coupled with a second, 
namely the assumption of the individual as the fundamental unit of society. To the extent 
that we conceptualize the social world in terms of atomistic units, and it is the function­
ing of the units that is focal, then relations among the units are both marginalized and 
problematized. They are marginalized because the relations are secondary to the concern 
with the units themselves. They are problematized because it is impossible to conceptual­
ize a social process in itself—that is, as anything more than the interaction between oth­
erwise separate entities. One may conceptualize A acting in his or her best interests upon 
B, and B’s responding in his or her bests interests by acting upon A, (essentially the view 
of behavior exchange theorists). But there is no quintessentially social process, with its 
structure, functions, patterns, and so on. Many social psychologists have long lamented 
the loss of “the social” in social psychology.1
It is in this light that the contents of the present Handbook stand in bold and exciting con­
trast to tradition. The first and most important step is that the contributors take as their 
starting point the very societal issues they wish to treat. The concern with social justice is 
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not derivative of some more general theory or of off-stage mental processes. Issues of so­
cial justice are not “applications,” but are worthy of exploration in themselves. This start­
ing point also enables the authors to make reference to psychological process without 
such processes overshadowing the subject matter of importance. At the same time, in the 
process of inquiry the palette of possible contingencies opens wide. For example, con­
tained within these chapters are concerns with history, economics, political dynamics, 
class conflicts, power dynamics, colonization, and globalization. One would be hard 
pressed to locate discussions of such issues in any major journal in social psychology. Fur­
ther, the contributors to this handbook have largely abandoned the romance with “truth 
through method” in general and the experimental method in particular. Issues of rigor 
take second place to their major investment in social change. This is not to say that evi­
dence does not play an important role in these chapters. However, for most of these au­
thors evidence is typically woven into a rich tapestry of deliberation—on theory, history, 
contemporary social conditions, and more. As I see it, a social psychology of social justice 
is not an attempt to establish the final word, drowning out all voices by the misleading 
“weight of the evidence,” but an attempt to enter cogently and passionately into the dia­
logues of the times.
I, for one, am enormously excited by the potentials of this emerging venture in social psy­
chology. It furnishes an escape from the cave of irrelevance in which the field has largely 
resided. I admire the work of these chapters as robust attempts to chart a new course. It 
is in the interest of enriching and strengthening this effort to which the remainder of this 
chapter is devoted. Specifically, I wish to pose a range of difficult questions about the pit­
falls and potentials of the present trajectory. Significant tensions wend their way through 
these pages, some crippling in their potential. Still other questions will be of the kind lev­
eled against the movement by more traditional social psychologists. Finally, there are 
horizons of possibility contained within these chapters that demand more concerted at­
tention. I do not intend to answer all questions, resolve all tensions, or chart the course 
for future work. My major aim is to press the dialogue forward in useful ways. In what fol­
lows I will consider, then, five significant challenges toward enriching the potentials of a 
social psychology of social justice.
Epistemology: Beyond the Crossroads
Why should we place our trust in any particular account of the world, whether it be an ac­
count of atoms or oppression? The answer to such a question typically makes reference to 
epistemological assumptions, or assumptions about how we know. Across the social sci­
ences there are three major contenders for epistemic authority. Two have deep roots in 
Western culture; the third is a more recent and cosmopolitan addition. Each of these ori­
entations has important implications for our forms of inquiry, the relationship between 
the scientist and those under study, the place of values in research, and the confidence 
placed in one’s reality posits. Debate among these positions has been heated, often form­
ing lines of demarcation among scientific enclaves. How are psychologists engaged in so­
cial justice research to orient themselves in this respect? In my reading of the preceding 
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chapters of this handbook, we find allegiances to all three. As one might conclude, just 
beneath the surface of this seeming unity in concerns are major differences in the con­
cept of knowledge and its acquisition. Let us explore.
At the outset, we have the traditional empiricist epistemology that has dominated social 
psychology for almost a century. From an epistemological (p. 444) standpoint, one as­
sumes a fundamental dichotomy between the observer and the world to be observed. By 
employing tools of controlled observation and systematic logic, one may ultimately estab­
lish descriptions and explanations that provide an accurate picture or map of the world as 
it is. While not necessarily embracing the full array of epistemic assumptions, many of the 
chapters in the present volume rely on empirical data, including standardized measures 
and statistical analysis, to support their various arguments and proposals. And while 
many authors do not openly embrace the tenets of empiricist epistemology, their accounts 
of the world are unapologetically realist. At the same time, other chapters display a 
hermeneutic/interpretivist orientation to epistemology. The assumption that knowledge of 
human action is grounded in observation is challenged on the grounds that action can on­
ly be understood in terms of the actor’s subjective condition (intention, meaning, experi­
ence). Thus, whatever is said about an actor’s behavior must be grounded in an interpre­
tive or hermeneutic process. Contributions to this volume by Frost (2018) and Cross 
(2018) are illustrative. The differences between these two longstanding orientations is 
significant, not simply in terms of assumptions, but also in matters of methodology and 
ethical responsibility.
Yet there is a third epistemology orientation at play throughout the volume, one that may 
properly be viewed as social constructionist. Here it is proposed that all accounts of the 
world are born within communities of interlocutors. One’s participation in the community 
will furnish the assumptions that guide one’s inquiry as well as the discursive conventions 
for description and explanation. Thus, there is no grounding of one’s knowledge claims 
outside the particular conventions of one’s community of practice. This orientation has 
been especially useful to social justice scholars, as it provides an important basis for the 
critical stance espoused in Hammack’s (2018) opening essay, along with chapters by 
Langdridge (2018) and Fine (2018). In each of these cases attention is drawn to the ideo­
logical investments of otherwise neutral, and empirically supported, accounts of the 
world.
Since its beginnings in the late 19th century, struggles over epistemology have had a divi­
sive effect on the field. Especially contentious has been the battle between positivists, as 
represented by early experimentalists, and interpretivists, as initially fueled by Dilthey’s 
(1894) emphasis on Verstehen (roughly, the empathic understanding of the subject’s expe­
rience). With the 20th century emergence of logical positivism, the interpretive orienta­
tion was delegitimized as an orientation to research, but with sustained allegiance in hu­
manistic and therapeutic circles. Even today, the fault line remains in the separation be­
tween members of the American Psychological Association (APA) and the Association for 
Psychological Science (APS). With the post-foundational and postmodern turns in the late 
20th century, foundational philosophy of science became widespread. And it is within this 
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context that a social view of science, indexed as social constructionism (constructivism), 
became a compelling alternative to logical positivism.2 In my view, a constructionist orien­
tation enables one to escape the internecine conflict between empiricists and interpre­
tivists. If we can understand these orientations as emerging within particular communi­
ties, for particular purposes and with particular values, we abandon the fight over funda­
mentals in favor of an epistemic pluralism. That is, we may ask about what may be accom­
plished (or not), and in what circumstances, by adopting these orientations. In many con­
ditions, an empiricist realism may carry significant political weight. Without systematic 
observation and empirical data, neither the Asch (1956) nor the Milgram (1963) classics 
would carry any social or political significance. In other conditions, the voices of suffering 
may be more commanding. The power of various witnessing projects rests on just such 
narratives. Those who draw from a constructionist perspective might, in turn, be drawn 
to the history, economics, or politics serving to legitimize a discourse of exclusion. Con­
cerns with the origins of “race” as a social category are illustrative. And by implication, 
invited into the arena of study may be other epistemological positions—feminist stand­
point, phenomenological, and practice-based among them.
Ontology: Social Justice in Question
Ontological questions follow closely on the heels of epistemological battles. Perhaps the 
most central issue in this case is the ontological status of social justice itself. How can we 
legitimate the concept of social justice; how can we identify when and where there is in­
justice? Each of the three epistemologies just discussed offers an answer to such ques­
tions, and these answers are radically different in implication. For the traditional empiri­
cist, justice and injustice are simply facts of social life—out there in the world, open to ob­
servation, subject to progressively better understanding through systematic (p. 445) re­
search. From the standpoint of a hermeneutic or interpretive perspective, we arrive at a 
far different place. Justice and injustice are not there in the world of observation, but they 
are constituted within the individual’s subjectivity. Thus we shift our concerns from social 
justice in itself to the experiences or subjectivities of those involved. The shift is a signifi­
cant one, as theorists point out that systemic injustice can go unseen, while nonetheless 
having deleterious effects on the experiences and lives of its victims.
For scholars with a constructionist sensibility, social justice is not a fact in the world but a 
way of constructing or appropriating a given configuration. As Opotow (2018) discusses, 
even social justice scholars themselves do not agree on conceptions of injustice. More un­
settling, and speaking metaphorically, if we use the lens injustice, we will potentially find 
it in our every action. Without such a lens, there is no injustice. It also follows that we suf­
fer from injustice when we construct the world in such a way that we are its victims. 
What may be experienced as “unfair treatment” by one could be constituted as a “ tough 
life” for another. This proposal has never been a happy one for those committed to social 
justice. It appears to deconstruct the very grounds for resistance and social change. Al­
though it is difficult to escape the constructionist logic, it can be viewed as morally repre­
hensible in its consequences. However, this critique is short-sighted. First, to point out 
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the culturally and historically situated condition of our constructions of justice and injus­
tice does not rob them of consequence. On the contrary, there is no true or grounded ac­
count of reality against which they can be compared. There is no authority that can de­
clare—without question—that “all is well.” For this, too, is a constructed world, and with­
out the means of declaring a counter-narrative untrue or invalid. In effect, to recognize 
the constructed character of our accounts of the world is to open a space for multiple 
voices.
There is more: to declare that injustice is an unalloyed fact is also an invitation to con­
flict. Such declarations suggest that there is someone or some group that is acting unjust­
ly. It is to make claim to a moral high ground, from which the unjust may be held account­
able—possibly shamed and punished. It is to invite resistance, antagonism, and retalia­
tion against an “evil other.” Those designated as unjust in this scenario are simultaneous­
ly thrust into a position of defensiveness—alienated, defensive, and possibly galvanized in 
their resistance. In contrast to the consequences of this realist orientation, to understand 
that one’s sense of injustice is one way of constructing a given condition—fully justified 
within a given enclave or tradition—is also to realize the possibility of other perspectives 
that may contain their own inherent justifications. Hutardo’s (2018) discussion of Border­
lands theory is illuminating in this context. Rather than creating a relationship of us ver­
sus them, it is to open the possibility of dialogue. It is to invite curiosity, mutual under­
standing, and possible collaboration in building a more mutually viable world.
Ethical Value: The Potentials of Pluralism
The present volume stands in stark contrast to virtually all other handbooks in social psy­
chology in the primacy of passion exhibited by so many of the authors. Traditional hand­
books are virtually lifeless in their accounts of the world, with value commitments either 
secreted into the subtext or absent altogether. In the present volume, a passionate com­
mitment to social justice is pervasive across the span of chapters. Such an orientation 
poses a major challenge to the field of social psychology. As earlier proposed, the tradi­
tional assumptions undergirding the field have rendered most of its research irrelevant to 
most of the major issues confronting society. Yet while inviting social and political en­
gagement, such passionate engagement comes at a cost. On the one side is the question 
of whether such research is too political. For example, in the chapters of this volume we 
find scholars unabashedly confronting racism, sexism, classism, homophobia, coloniza­
tion, liberalism, neo-liberalism, individualism, and more. Clearly such accounts are “ideo­
logically loaded.” As such, they risk losing the rhetorical power of “speaking objectively.” 
To put it another way, for the uncommitted reader they are propaganda masking as sci­
ence. This is not a small problem. For example, members of the US Congress already 
question the liberal biases in most social research, distrusting their conclusions, and de­
bating the legitimacy of their applications for governmental funding.
At the same time, as we have come to realize (Hammack, 2018), all research is value sat­
urated in its inception and its potential consequences. For example, even the most neu­
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tral study of the brain basis of mathematical reasoning leaps from the safety of “is” to 
bear torches of “ought” into society. Among other things such research implicitly champi­
ons the value of predicting and controlling human behavior, potentially enhances the pow­
er of those in a position to control, sustains an individualist ideology, and eliminates “free 
will” as a discursive tool in the pursuit of moral responsibility. (p. 446) Enlightenment re­
garding the values inherent in research of any kind—both in the social and natural sci­
ences—should not only be central in the agenda of a social psychology of social justice, 
but of a liberal education more generally.
Given that all theory and research is value saturated, the invitation for the scholar is to 
choose those projects that best express their passions. Yet such a posture also yields a 
new dilemma: reader response bias. That is, the ideological biases of the reader will de­
termine whether the inquiry is compelling or not. If the message is liberal, even the most 
rigorously performed research, accompanied by the most sophisticated statistics, will 
seem propagandistic to the committed conservative. Is this to say that social justice in­
quiry, as represented by most of the chapters in this volume, will only speak cogently to 
those already committed to their agenda? Herein lies a challenging question for the fu­
ture: our forms of scientific writing not only communicate ideas and information; they al­
so form relations with our readers (Gergen, 2012). As proposed earlier, there is a strong 
sense in which social justice writing can demonize those who, by implication, are respon­
sible for the injustice. In effect, the very form of exposition may function to distance itself 
from those whose cooperation is most needed in the pursuit of social change.
In effect, we here confront the dilemma of competing values. Social justice research is 
more transparent than most in its value commitments. But let us recognize that while 
such researchers generally support equality, democracy, socialized economy, human free­
dom, and the like, there are also traditions that support equity over equality, a firmly or­
dered society, free market competition, and a society united in its religious commitment. 
Further, even when committed to the values of social justice, one is simultaneously invest­
ed in other values that—in terms of daily life—are often in conflict. Even social justice re­
searchers must decide how much of their time they will allocate to such work as opposed 
to the well-being of families, friends, the environment, their personal health, and so on.
Perhaps the most important question here, however, is how to approach those enclaves 
whose values run counter to social justice investments. It’s not that such groups—such as 
neo-liberals—are against justice so much as that the values and policies they espouse con­
tribute so directly to what we take to be injustice. Indeed, neo-liberals and other targets 
of critique may argue that their primary interests are in human well-being—even if their 
conception of well-being and the means for its achievement are injurious in other ways. 
As ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre (1988) cogently asks, “whose justice, which rationalities” 
should prevail? In certain respects we reach a condition similar to the preceding discus­
sion of ontology. A realist orientation to ontology is similar to a foundationalist view of 
values. Firm declarations of what is or is not just are equivalent to commitments to a giv­
en moral or ethical position: both will serve to divide and alienate. Both will favor condi­
tions for what may ultimately become mutual annihilation. There is good reason, then, for 
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a social psychology of social justice to embrace a value pluralism. This is not an “anything 
goes” orientation that might suggest that all values are equal. Rather, it is to recognize 
that one’s value preferences issue from a given tradition at a particular point in history 
and are situated within a particular circumstance. That they have no other foundations 
than their social lodgment does not delegitimize them. Rather, it is this very lodgment 
from which they gain their credibility. However, a value pluralism does invite greater 
modesty in terms of one’s claims and simultaneously lays the grounds for more dialogical­
ly based means of dealing with inevitable conflicts.
Explanatory Fulcrum: Paradigms and Pragmat­
ics
As noted earlier, the present volume is unique in social psychology in its expansive sensi­
tivities to conditions, processes and events outside the dominant focus on mental process. 
Thus, we find frequent recourse in these pages to discussions of economics, history, poli­
tics, social structure, and more. This is indeed a formidable mixture and substantially en­
riches the range of discussions in which social psychologists should properly be involved. 
However, there are also significant challenges in expanding the arena of understanding in 
this way. Perhaps the central problem in this case has to do with the explanatory fulcrum 
of understanding. Given what we take to be acts of injustice, how are they to be ex­
plained? The central problem has long been endemic to social psychology, as the field has 
variously shifted between situation (“bottom up” environmentalist) and person centered 
(“top down” hereditary) explanations. Cultural explanations are typically incorporated in­
to one or both of these orientations, with brain-based explanations falling into the person- 
centered camp. This problem in competing explanatory bases is inflated in the present 
volume. To be sure, some contributors to this volume (p. 447) do rely on psychological ex­
planations (for example, Durheim & Dixon, 2018; Cohrs & O’Dwyer, 2018). At the same 
time, other social justice psychologists focus on micro-social explanations, including rela­
tional practices of exclusion (Walker & Smith, 2018) and dialogue (Maoz, 2018). Still oth­
ers place far more stress on macro-social processes and structures, including history 
(Langhout & Fernandez, 2018), social structure (Stewart & Zucker, 2018), the legal sys­
tem (Tileagă, 2018), social class (Bullock & Reppond, 2018), colonization (Hutardo, 
2018), and globalization (Bhatia, 2018). Interestingly, while traditional social psychology 
has abandoned voluntarist explanations—with their anti-scientific echoes of free will—sig­
nificant remnants of voluntarism remain within the social justice arena. In this volume, 
Liu and Pratto (2018) are clear in their commitment to a conception of individual agency. 
One may also say that agency lies implicit in all accounts of injustice, as all are implicitly 
intended to incite action. The goal is social change. Such provocations necessarily rest on 
the assumption that individuals are free to abandon their conventions and do otherwise.
How then is the researcher to select among these explanatory orientations? None can be 
rendered superior in terms of evidence, as the explanatory orientations themselves deter­
mine what counts as evidence. Most important, we also confront the dilemma that once 
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we select an explanatory discourse, it will in principle eliminate all contending forms of 
explanation. An explanatory discourse essentially establishes an ontology, and once that 
ontology is embraced within an enclave of researchers, its competitors tend to be (1) ren­
dered irrelevant and removed from view, (2) deemed problematic and delegitimized, or 
(3) offered as candidates for reductionism. In the first instance, for example, to view psy­
chological process as central to human action potentially removes sociological explana­
tions from interest. “Social structure is not our concern; that’s what sociologists study.” 
To illustrate the case of destroying existence, for micro-social theorists, psychological 
process is not a fact in the world. One theorizes the use of psychological discourse in so­
cial relations, but to treat such discourse as referential—indexing actual mental states— 
would be misleading objectification. And in the third case, once committed to a given on­
tology of explanation, other ontologies are subject to reductionism. This is indeed a major 
challenge within contemporary psychology as psychological processes are increasingly 
shown to be “nothing but” neurological activity. This is the challenge of eliminative mate­
rialism (Ramsey, 2016). Similarly, for many psychologists, there is no social structure, in 
fact; what we call social structure is the result of mental construal, a cognitive or inter­
pretive construction.
To recognize that a choice in the form of explanation can eliminate or reduce all compet­
ing ontologies also speaks to a related problem in the social psychology of social justice: 
relating the individual to macro-social entities or processes. There is frequent and laud­
able concern within the pages of this handbook with the relationship of the individual to 
social institutions, economic systems, the culture, and so on. Often a causal relationship 
is posited, with the institutions, economic structures, or societal processes affecting the 
behavior of the individual. Yet as I am suggesting, these attempts at inclusion are deeply 
problematic. We have available multiple vocabularies for explaining injustice, but the vo­
cabularies are self-contained and totalizing. Consider, for example, an attempt to show 
how socio-economic status (SES) influences the individual’s prejudices. The attempt 
seems reasonable enough: we should be able to demonstrate a causal connection be­
tween SES and individual behavior. Such a demonstration depends, however, on estab­
lishing the independence of the two units. Yet if we were to remove from the table every­
one occupying the class structure, there would be no individuals upon which the struc­
ture could have an effect. Likewise, to remove all the individuals, there would be nothing 
left over to call a class structure. In effect, we have a single “observational world,” as we 
may call it, and two descriptive vocabularies. We come to mistake the vocabularies for ac­
tual entities, and unwittingly proceed to study their causal relations. The same may be 
said for all attempts to posit causal relations between macro units (economic, governmen­
tal, cultural, and so on) and the individual’s mental states or behavior. It is this very prob­
lem of non-independence that enables one to reduce the former to the latter.
How, then, are we to proceed in the further development of a social psychology of social 
justice? In understanding the world in terms of mental process, we will eliminate the rich 
repository of scholarship on which dialogues about social justice are given life. The field 
becomes isolated. If we eliminate psychological explanation, then a specifically “social 
psychology of social justice” escapes intelligibility. In my view the answer to this issue lies 
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in the appreciative recognition of multiple, non-competing frameworks or perspectives. 
With each (p. 448) framework—whether psychological, interpersonal, inter-group, or 
macro social—we come to understand the world in different ways. And with each illumi­
nation, new paths of action are suggested. Again we encounter the challenge of plural­
ism. We may ask in each case about the pragmatic value or outcomes of various alterna­
tives, and remain flexible within a context of shifting circumstance. I am proposing, then, 
that we replace the search for Truth with a reflective pragmatism (Gergen, 2015). We 
cease to ask whether any account, description, or analysis of what is the case is “true in 
all worlds.” Rather, we inquire into what difference such accounts make to our lives, to 
our practices, to the culture in which we live, and to the world more generally should we 
accept and sustain them. Such an inquiry is clearly value laden, as we must be prepared 
to inquire into who gains and losses as a result of a particular account; whose voices are 
silenced; and who is advantaged and in what ways.
The Challenges of Representationalism
Fields of endeavor such as the present handbook do not arrive de novo on the intellectual 
scene. As many of the contributors to this work point out, there is inspiration to be drawn 
from early pioneers in social psychology. At the same time one must be circumspect about 
this legacy, as it also contains elements that may be inimical to the goal of social justice. 
Indeed, critical psychologists in the present volume are keen to point out a range of divi­
sive and oppressive assumptions and practices that characterize much of social 
psychology’s history. It is in this light that attention should be drawn to the forms of in­
quiry currently playing a central role in social justice work. My chief concern in this case 
is the pervasive reliance on a representationalist tradition regarding the relationship of 
word and world. In spite of the critical, interpretivist, and constructionist ideas that per­
vade the social justice literature, research is primarily employed as a means of represent­
ing the world—of illuminating, demonstrating, providing evidence for, showing, indicat­
ing, and so on. In effect, the aim of research is to provide a configuration of words that 
picture, map, or otherwise mirror the world as it is. It is in this context that attention 
must be drawn to a range of issues critical to the future of social justice psychology:
Rights to Representation
For scholars and scientists, the representationalist tradition has largely functioned as a 
means of securing voice—that is, enabling the researcher to claim authority over the 
“mere opinions” or “subjective” views of the masses. In the special case of social justice 
research, this tradition places the researcher in the precarious position of “speaking for 
others”—the oppressed, marginalized, dispossessed, and so on. As the history of feminist 
inquiry has demonstrated, such authority claims are not only subject to the critique of 
those who are represented but may also be viewed as yet another form of silencing. White 
feminist scholars were thus placed under attack from Black feminists (“What right do you 
have to speak for us?”); nor were Black feminists permitted to speak for women victims of 
colonialist subjugation. It is the question confronted on many college campuses as to 
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whether “straight” scholars should be hired to teach in queer studies programs. It is also 
the rationale behind the cry of those whom the scholarly professions label as “disabled”: 
“Nothing about us without us.” When extended to its logical extreme, such a logic would 
suggest that no one should have the right to represent anyone except oneself. It is just 
such thinking that underlies much autoethnography (Jones, Adams, & Ellis, 2013). Such a 
conclusion would indeed be unfortunate. However, exploration is needed into means of 
abandoning the rhetoric of authority in scientific representations and/or including multi­
ple voices in research undertakings.
Representations for Whom?
Reliance on a rhetoric of authority also determines in large degree the audience for scien­
tific representations. Under current conditions this audience is primarily constituted by 
scholars and researchers. As a critic might surmise, academic research on social justice 
is largely written for a limited network of like-minded academics. Worse still, it is pub­
lished in journals that are largely unavailable to the world at large. Indeed, like the chap­
ters of this handbook, the present offering is subject to such criticism. It is not simply 
that this rhetorical tradition is “elitist,” but it cannot be absorbed by the very populations 
for whom it is designed to serve. In this light, movements to make all research available 
on open-source providers are to be welcomed. However, if work on social justice is to 
reach its full potential, means must be found for communicating to a multi-cultural, pub­
lic audience. It is here that social justice researchers would be advantaged by developing 
closer relationships with arts-based researchers.3 Film, theater, photography, painting, 
and multi-media are all in active play, and all have been used as means of bringing atten­
tion to issues (p. 449) of social injustice. Arts-based media might well be added to the cur­
ricula for politically engaged social psychologists.
Truth in Representation
Perhaps the most wisely shared critique of the representationalist tradition draws from 
linguistic philosophy, literary theory, and social constructionist dialogues.4 The critical 
point in question is the relationship between the world and words (or any other form of 
representation). Whatever exists makes no demands on how it is described. Thus, while 
words may seem to function as mirrors of the world, they do so only by virtue of commu­
nities of agreement. Regardless of what is observed, to say that “the cat is on the mat,” is 
no more or less true than describing the same observation by saying “God is in his heav­
en.” The validity of the former wholly rests on whether we agree in how the terms are 
used in the given circumstance. In effect, this line of argument undermines the validity of 
any account of the world, save for those who agree to the way in which the language is 
employed. Regardless of its rigor, research cannot provide culture-=free and value-free 
findings. As a result, claims to Truth may thus be viewed as duplicitous and oppressive; 
they treat one’s position as true regardless of anyone’s opinion or values—in short, as a 
God’s eye pronouncement. The implications of this line of argument have had a marked 
effect in anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, and other corners of the social sci­
ences. They have yet to be digested in psychology. Future researchers would benefit 
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greatly from exploring the various ways in which these companionate disciplines have 
been able to “speak their truths” while simultaneously subverting their authority.
Means of Representation
The continuing debates on the assets and liabilities of various research methods often 
center on the justification of authority claims. For example, are one’s methods sufficiently 
rigorous and unbiased, is the evidence valid and reliable, is the sample size sufficient to 
warrant generalization, and so on. As we have seen from the preceding discussion, such 
criteria are themselves subject to question. They are essentially byproducts of one, 
among many, ways of viewing knowledge. However, one significant criterion—typically 
overlooked but central to issues of social justice—is the ideological and political weight 
carried by research methods themselves. Methodological practices are not ideologically 
neutral. They are forms of life, carrying assumptions about what is good, important, prop­
er, or desirable in cultural life. In the case of experimental methods, for example, one 
adds credibility to an individualist and mechanistic world view, in which the social world 
is presumed to be made up of isolated, robotic entities. In eschewing the presumption of 
voluntary action, the very grounds for political action are thrown into question. Narrative 
research, in contrast, typically lends credibility—and often honor—to individual experi­
ence. At the same time, however, the researcher again suggests a world in which we are 
fundamentally separated, each residing in a private interior. It is here that social justice 
researchers might wish to employ research methods that add weight to their ideological 
or political visions for the future. For example, in this context many researchers turn to 
collaborative research practices, with the explicit aim of replacing the hierarchical rela­
tionship between scientist and subject with communal participation.5
Horizons of Research: From Mirror to World- 
Making
One of the major reasons for the success of the natural sciences lies in their capacity to 
bring about changes in our worlds of practice. Such sciences have cured disease, har­
nessed energies, controlled pestilences, and taken humans to the moon. Although the dis­
course that such sciences have employed in their pursuits may be found in the libraries of 
the world, these discursive configurations were neither the aim of the sciences nor the 
reason for their significance. Or, one might say, the discourse was simply their local 
means of communicating about what they were doing and why, while the true knowledge 
was constituted within the process from which actionable outcomes emerged. In my view, 
a social psychology of social justice is enormously important for the field because it be­
gins to reverse the emphasis from discourse to actionable outcomes. Researchers begin 
with concrete and complex issues in society with the goal of social transformation. As so 
many of the chapters in this volume suggest, by means of transforming our understand­
ing, liberating us from the taken-for-granted, demonstrating daily injustices, giving voice 
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to the marginalized, and actively transforming community life, the directions are promis­
ing indeed.
At the same time, as I have pointed out, research is still largely representational, with 
publication in journals and books serving as the ultimate outcome. In my view, if the field 
is to become truly (p. 450) consequential, a shift will be required from research that 
metaphorically mirrors the world to inquiry that actively achieves social change (Gergen, 
2015). I fear that the deliberations of isolated academic enclaves do little to change the 
world. To be sure, the kind of critical work represented in this volume can arouse resis­
tance to the status quo among interested readers. Yet remaining, however, is the question 
of mobilizing for action. More directly consequential are active interventions into cultural 
life. The most obvious form of such inquiry at present is represented in participatory ac­
tion research (Bradbury, 2015). Illustrative is Bhatia’s work with the Friends of Shelter 
Associates to facilitate sanitation among impoverished Indian communities, Fine and 
Torre’s (2006) attempts to help women in prison gain their rights, and Hammack’s (2011) 
work with Israeli and Palestinian youth to reach mutual understanding. Here the end­
point of inquiry is not “words on a page” but social change itself. At the same time, 
future=forming inquiry should also include the development of social practices contribut­
ing to a just society. For example, in this volume, Nagda, Gurin, and Rodríguez (2018) 
outline practices for social justice dialogue in educational systems. Inspiration may also 
be drawn from the practice of appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005), along 
with practices developed by the Public Conversations Project (Herzig & Chasin, 2005), 
which are both used effectively around the globe for replacing hostility with constructive 
dialogue. Finally, social justice psychologists can play an active role in the courts. Herek’s 
(2018) contribution to this handbook is illustrative. In all cases, scholars move into the 
world as active agents of change. Herein lies a central challenge for the future of social 
justice psychology.
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